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I
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Richard Posner are the two dominant judge-scholars in the American legal tradition. They share much
in common. They were born with a clear, effortless prose style that
allowed them to capture subtle ideas with a few brushstrokes. Both
enjoyed liberal educations (at Harvard and Yale, respectively). Thereafter, each continued to read the classics (in their original languages)
and remain in tune with the intellectual currents of their time. They
served on distinguished law faculties (Holmes at Harvard; Posner at
Stanford, then Chicago) before going on to spend most of their careers on the bench. And, as scholars, each started as a pragmatist who
made his mark by producing a single volume that tried to make sense
of the common law. The task was accounting for the outcome of discrete cases. What mattered was what courts did, not what they said.
They were both young astronomers who looked skyward and devoted
all their energy to giving an account of the heavens.
Holmes was the young astronomer who, while a careful observer,
doubted there was any inner logic to the movement of the legal heavens:
[W]hile, on the one hand, there are a great many rules which are
quite sufficiently accounted for by their manifest good sense, on
the other, there are some which can only be understood by refer-

t Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago Law
School. I am grateful to Visa U.S.A., Inc., and the John M. Olin Foundation for research support.
1 This metaphor has, of course, long been associated with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. See
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., The Poet at the Breakfast-Table (Osgood 1872).
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ence to the infancy of procedure among the German tribes, or to
the social condition of Rome under the Decemvirs.'
He cautioned against expecting too much wisdom from old cases:
[J]ust as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some
earlier creature to which a collarbone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after the use they once served is at an end
and the reason for them has been forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusion from the merely
logical point of view.'
By contrast, the young Richard Posner believed in an internal
logic to the movement of the spheres. Economic principles explained
the outcome of decided cases and hence do much to help one decide
new ones.
For this reason, when Posner joined the bench, it might seem his
ambitions were greater than those of Holmes. If there were an inner
logic to common law decisionmaking, the judge who understood it
should be able to decide cases more easily. Posner not only had a distinctive vision of the common law, but implicitly claimed that this vision could assist judges in deciding cases. In this Essay, I examine one
of Richard Posner's opinions - Oxxford Clothes XX v Expeditors Intern of Washington, Inc'to show whether, over one domain, he has

been able to realize that promise.
II
Oxxford Clothes made expensive suits for men out of imported
cloth. It defaulted to its largest creditor, one that had a lien on all of its
assets. This creditor foreclosed on the assets and transferred them to a
newly formed corporation (Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc). To the outside
world, the business operated as before. The new entity, however, was
not liable for the debts of the old, and hence Oxxford Clothes's old
general creditors were left out in the cold. One of these was Expeditors, a firm that specialized in clearing goods through customs. The
new entity-one that appeared to the outside world the same as the
old-asked Expeditors to clear new cloth through customs. Expeditors
cleared it through customs, but then refused to turn it over until the
company was paid everything that the old entity (Oxxford Clothes,
Inc) owed it.

2
3

4

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 5 (Belknap 1967) (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed).
Id at 31.
127 F3d 574 (7th Cir 1997).
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Oxxford XX sued Expeditors in federal court. Because it could
not meet its obligations to major retailers without the cloth, Oxxford
XX sought a preliminary injunction, but the district judge refused to
issue it. At this point, Oxxford XX concluded it had no choice. It gave
in to Expeditors' demands and paid what the old corporation owed.
After it got possession of the fabric, Oxxford XX went back to court
demanding that Expeditors return the money on the ground that the
payment had been extracted from it under duress. The case finally
made its way to the Seventh Circuit and Judge Richard Posner.
In deciding this case, Posner had to identify the essential elements
of contractual duress. It is not easy. Renegotiations during the course
of a contract may reflect raw opportunism. A party who demands
changes to an existing deal may simply be taking advantage of the
other party's vulnerability. Consider the following. One manufacturer
makes specialized radar sets for the Navy.' Another promises to supply a crucial component for a fixed price, but at the last minute demands a higher price knowing that no one else can deliver the needed
parts on time. It extracts a better deal even though nothing justifies it.
A willingness to enforce new terms under such circumstances ultimately makes both parties worse off. When I cannot prevent you from
holding me up, I cannot rely on your promise as much in the first instance and it is therefore less valuable. Equipment makers will pay
less, use less efficient means of production (such as vertical integration), and make fewer supplier-specific investments:
It undermines the institution of contract to allow a contract party
to use the threat of breach to get the contract modified in his favor not because anything has happened to require modification
in the mutual interest of the parties but simply because the other
party, unless he knuckles under to the threat, will incur costs for
which he will have no adequate legal remedy.'
But at other times, renegotiation is in the mutual self-interest of
both parties. The Great Depression brought with it deflation and
made it impossible for an existing tenant to pay the old rent, yet no
business could enter the same premises and pay more. The old tenant
remained the highest-valued user, but neither the current tenant nor
anyone else could survive at this location with the current rent. It was
in the tenant's interest and the landlord's interest to renegotiate the

5
See Austin Instrument, Inc v Loral Corp, 29 NY2d 124, 272 NE2d 533, 534 (1971) (describing how subcontractor Austin Instrument refused to deliver necessary parts for a radar
system unless they received substantial price increases in a renegotiated contract).
6
Selmer Co v Blakeslee-Midwest Co, 704 F2d 924,927 (7th Cir 1983) (Posner).
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lease and to lower the rent. The law of contracts faces the challenge
of distinguishing between mutually beneficial renegotiations on the
one hand and opportunistic hold-ups on the other.
Posner starts the inquiry into whether the doctrine of duress is
available in a case such as Oxxford in the same way he begins other
inquiries: finding the iconic precedent. For duress, it is Alaska Packers'
Association v Domenico,' an admiralty case decided by the Ninth Circuit at the start of the last century. The case is rarely cited.' The young
associate or law clerk trolling for binding precedent does not approach
such questions in the same way. For them, Alaska Packers' is ancient
and irrelevant. But for Posner such a case serves rather as an essential
benchmark against which the claims before him can be assessed.
In Alaska Packers', the appellate court recounts how a group of
fishermen recruited to work for a season in Alaska refused to fish
without a pay increase. Their employer gave in to their demands, but
then refused to pay once the season was over. The fishermen sued and
the court held the renegotiated deal unenforceable. In return for the
promise to increase wages, the fisherman gave nothing. They agreed to
do only what they were already legally obliged to do. Hence, the employer's promise was not given in exchange for anything. It was without consideration and therefore unenforceable.
It takes little reflection to see that resolving the case using the
doctrine of consideration is of little use in separating those situations
in which the renegotiation is value-enhancing from those in which it is
not. The tenant hit by the Great Depression and the supplier who sees
an opportunity to jack up his price are both under a pre-existing duty
to perform. The change in contract terms is not in exchange for any
new consideration. Moreover, if an absence of consideration somehow
distinguished the two cases, the rule is of little use as it is trivially easy
to circumvent. If Alaska Packers' were indeed merely about consideration, the fishermen could make the same demand the next year, but
offer at the same time some small change in their promise (such as
7 Courts have sometimes refused to recognize this renegotiated promise on grounds that
no consideration exists when one party merely undertakes to do what he already obliged himself
to do. See, for example, Levine v Blumenthal, 117 NJ L 23, 186 A 457, 458 (1936) ("The principle
is firmly imbedded in our jurisprudence that a promise to do what the promisor is already legally
bound to do is an unreal consideration.").
8
117 F 99 (9th Cir 1902).
9 Alaska Packers' has been cited thirteen times in the last quarter century, according to a
Lexis Shepard's citation search. Twelve of those citations appeared in cases decided by the Seventh Circuit, of which Posner authored eight. (Of the other four, three were authored by Judge
Easterbrook and the other by Judge Ripple). See also Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska
Packers' Association v. Domenico, in Douglas G. Baird, ed, Contracts Stories 335, 342 (Foundation 2006) (describing how Posner has established the prevailing view of Alaska Packers' as a
classic case of renegotiation under duress).

HeinOnline -- 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1644 2007

2007]

The Young Astronomers

1645

working one day or one hour or one minute longer) in exchange for
the promise of higher wages. Any increased burden assumed would
itself provide sufficient consideration under classical doctrine.
But for Posner as both judge and scholar, one must go beyond the
language of the opinion. The true ground of the decision is duress: "Although the technical ground of decision was the absence of fresh consideration for the modified agreement, it seems apparent . .. that the

court's underlying concern was that the modified agreement had been
procured by duress in the form of the threat to break the original contract.""o To gain some traction on this question, Posner makes his reliance on economic principles explicit: "Duress, understood most concretely, is the situation in which one person obtains a temporary monopoly that it tries to use to obtain a benefit to which it is not entitled."" It might seem this observation does not take us that much further. How does one show how the other was trying to identify "a benefit to which it was not entitled," as opposed to asking for something to
which it was entitled? Why is the tenant during the Great Depression
"entitled" to ask for a break from an otherwise binding contact, but
the supplier of a crucial part is not?
Economics provides some help here, of course. Some renegotiated deals are value-enhancing and others are not. In our Depression
hypothetical, the tenant could not stay in business under the terms of
the original lease. The renegotiation did not merely redistribute
wealth between the parties, but also ensured that assets would be put
to their highest valued use. Even the landlord was better off with the
new contract, as no one could operate under the terms of the existing
lease. Nevertheless, distinguishing value-enhancing renegotiations
from others is hard, at least if the party engaged in opportunism exercises some modest imagination. Even outright extortion is done with a
certain amount of indirection. The gangster does not say he will break
your shop window unless he is paid off. Instead, he offers you "protection" from such mishaps in return for a fee. Hypocrisy is the deference
vice pays to virtue.
Focusing on duress does not make even a case such as Alaska
Packers' easy, as even a cursory examination of the record in that case
makes plain. 2 The fishermen in Alaska Packers' may not have en10 Selmer, 704 F2d at 927.
11 ProfessionalService Network, Inc v American Alliance Holding Co, 238 F3d 897,900 (7th
Cir 2001) (Posner).
12 Debora Threedy has made a comprehensive study of the record in the case. See Threedy,
Fish Story at 350-51 (cited in note 9). For the full trial transcript of the case, see Transcript of
Record, Alaska Packers'Assocation v Domenico, No 789, 18-22 (9th Cir filed Feb 4, 1902), online
at http://old.law.utah.edulfaculty/bios/threedyd/threedyd-alaska-transcript.pdf (visited Sept 29,
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gaged in extortion at all. They asserted that the nets they were given
were defective. Because their pay was geared to the number of fish
they caught, they might well have had legitimate grounds for complaint if the equipment they were given was not what they expected.
Indeed, if the packers had promised serviceable nets and these nets
were not serviceable, the packers would have been in breach and the
fishermen would have been entitled to cease performance. A renegotiated contract in which the fishermen agreed to work with defective
nets in return for higher wages would be entirely enforceable.
In rejecting the fishermen's account of conditions in Alaska, the
Ninth Circuit relied in part on the intuition that the packer had every
incentive to provide good nets. But the judge who wrote Economic
Analysis of Law cannot accept such intuitions uncritically, and, like
many untutored intuitions, this one is flawed. A trade-off must be
made between the costs of buying new nets and the costs of fishing
with older, less efficient ones. The packer bore all the costs associated
with acquiring new nets, but did not enjoy all of the benefits of using
them, given that the fishermen were paid on the basis of the number
of fish they caught.
Moreover, while the fishermen had an incentive to catch as many
fish as possible, the packer had an upper limit on the number of fish it
could use. It had the supplies necessary to can only a given number of
salmon and had no use for the excess. Given that the packer needed a
certain number of the fishermen to man the ships back and forth, it
might have had no need to provide them with decent equipment. It
may have needed so many hands to sail the boat that even with substandard nets the fishermen would have caught enough to meet the
capacity of the plant.
There is an additional wrinkle. This fishery departed from customary practice. It used old nets in combination with new nets. The
packer claimed that unique conditions at this fishery justified this departure from convention. Even assuming that this was true, however,
the packers may have had a duty to disclose. When the packer promised to provide nets, it might have been obliged, unless it disclosed
otherwise, to provide nets of the type ordinarily used. Even if they had
no such obligation, this case might be one of mutual mistake." Each
party reasonably thought that the bargain was for the type of net to
which they were accustomed. The mutual mistake may have prevented
2007) (describing one witness's claim that the fishermen demanded increased pay only after
finding that the nets supplied by the Packers were defective).
13 The Posnerian judge would think of Raffles v Wichelhaus, 2 H & C 906,159 Eng Rep 375,
375 (Ex 1864) (holding a contract unenforceable based on confusion between the parties as to
which of two ships, both named "Peerless," was to deliver a shipment of cotton).
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an objective meeting of the minds and hence forestalled an enforceable contract. If there was no enforceable deal initially, any deal struck
in Alaska would be enforceable.
The Ninth Circuit also likely misunderstood the bargaining dynamic. The amount of bargaining power that the fishermen enjoyed
may have been modest. The court assumed that a strike would expose
the packer to heavy losses. This was not true. First, the packer relied
upon native fishermen in addition to those who manned the ship.
Even if the fishermen under contract did not work at all, the season's
catch would not be entirely lost. Second, the Alaska Packers' Association was a cartel and, as such, artificially limited the supply of salmon
produced each year. It was in the process of shutting down its least
efficient canneries and would soon close this one. Even if no salmon
were caught from this cannery, the packer could make up the deficit
either by increasing output or releasing more of the surplus catch
from previous years to the market.
By contrast, the fishermen found themselves thousands of miles
from home and counted upon the packer to provide food and housing.
Their dependence on the packer further constrained them from acting
opportunistically. The packer may well have had the ability to control
naked opportunism on the part of the fishermen. To be sure, the packer
needed to recruit additional fishermen in subsequent years, and no one
wants to work for a business that refuses to pay the wages it promises.
Nevertheless, as long as others could distinguish situations in which the
packer was retaliating against the fishermen for their own opportunistic
behavior from those in which it was behaving opportunistically itself,
the reputational costs of retaliation might be manageable.
Such messy factual inquiries, however, are quite beside the
point. For Posner, the sine qua non of an action for duress is the existence of a temporary monopoly. Whether it actually existed under
the facts of Alaska Packers' is neither here nor there. With respect to
any claim of duress, there must be a situational monopoly. The essential lesson of Alaska Packers' is that the packer's claim was plausible
only because it had no access to a court at the time the fishermen
demanded higher pay. Regardless of the ultimate merits, the case
stands for the proposition that every duress case must contain an
essential ingredient-a situational monopoly. When it is missing, the
claim of duress can be rejected.
A situational monopoly can exist only if the party claiming duress
now in court once did not have access to the court: "The hallmark of
duress or extortion is that the victim has no feasible legal remedy.""
14

Oxxford, 127 F3d at 579.

HeinOnline -- 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1647 2007

The University of Chicago Law Review

1648

[74:1641

This distinguishes Alaska Packers' from many other cases-including

Oxxford-in which duress is alleged:
The promise had been made under duress because the defendant
had had no feasible remedy against the seamen's demand. It
could not have "covered" by hiring substitute seamen on the
spot, given the brevity of the Alaska salmon season and the limited supply of seamen in Alaska. And it would not have been feasible for it to sue them, as the filing of many suits would have been
necessary and the chances of collecting a significant judgment
from each seaman at reasonable cost would have been remote."
Oxxford's action for duress fails because, unlike the packers, the
doors of the courthouse were always open to it. Even if one accepts
the allegations of the complaint -that Expeditors had utterly no leg to
stand on and was acting entirely improperly in holding on to the
cloth-Oxxford had to lose because it had (and indeed invoked) an
entirely feasible legal remedy. Its failure to appeal once it lost in the
district court was inexplicable.
By zeroing in on the question of whether the aggrieved party has
an adequate legal remedy, Posner provides a rule that resolves most of
the cases. Only in hard cases, such as Alaska Packers',where going to
court is not an option, does one have to engage in the difficult inquiry
of whether what is happening is genuine duress or whether it is a reasonable effort to renegotiate in light of changed circumstances.
Under Posner's approach, it is unnecessary to ask whether advantage-taking is going on in the vast majority of cases. Among the various economic principles at work in cases of alleged economic duress,
Posner focuses on the one that is both easy to decide and that disposes
of most of the cases. For Posner, a case such as Alaska Packers' is not
so much a judicial opinion where the analysis weaves together fact
and law in an intricate web, as much as it is a useful shorthand for an
important and simple idea. The facts themselves are not even that important. Indeed, over time, Posner's recounting of the facts of Alaska
Packers' has become increasingly distant from those in the opinion.
The fishermen become sailors on a boat trying to coerce the captain,
as opposed to fishermen encamped in a barracks trying to deal with
an inexperienced agent."
Is

Id.

16

Id.
See, for example, Trompler, Inc v NLRB, 338 F3d 747, 751 (7th Cir 2003) ("Seamen on
board a ship that was fishing for salmon in Alaskan waters during the short fishing season struck
for higher wages. The captain agreed to modify the workers' employment contract to pay them
the higher wages they were demanding.").
17
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III
Posner's approach-as powerful and useful as it is-may partially
obscure a problem that is deeply embedded in any system of civil justice."' What does it mean to say that an effective judicial remedy is not
available? Alaska Packers' is a case that lives in a world in which the
courts are not available. But when is this ever going to happen today?
Technological innovation has reduced the distance to the courthouse
for everyone. If someone succumbs to a demand today because there
is no effective legal remedy to protect his rights, in what sense can one
say that the individual possesses a right in the first instance? For a
judge such as Posner, the answer is simple: not very often.
To explain why duress ought to be recognized in a case such as
Oxxford, one needs to explain why preliminary relief was not available. If we accept (as Posner does for purposes of analyzing the duress
question) that Expeditors had no right to keep the fabric at all, Oxxford should have been able to obtain preliminary relief. Expeditors
asserted it had only a lien in the cloth. Hence, by its own account, its
only right in the cloth was the right to be paid a fixed sum. The judge
would need only require Oxxford to post a bond as a condition of
granting preliminary relief to protect Expeditors fully. Moreover,
unlike an ordinary contract dispute, this was one in which common
law courts had long granted specific relief. In short, there were few
costs to granting a preliminary injunction, even if it turned out later to
be issued erroneously. There was no harm to Expeditors by denying
the injunction and substantial benefit to Oxxford from granting it. As
long as Expeditors had no right to keep the fabrics on the basis of a
debt owed by a different corporation, refusing to grant the prelimi19
nary injunction seems wrong.
For Posner, however, an error on the part of the district judge
makes no difference. Posner appears quite inclined to accept the idea
that the district court should have issued the injunction. Without quite
saying so, he leaves the impression that the district court blundered:
Expeditors made silly noises about having a lien on the fabric, and the
judge thought such an argument both meritorious and sufficient when
it was likely neither. But error on the part of the district court is irrelevant. Oxxford could still have sought immediate relief in the Seventh Circuit. Some appellate courts would not be able to respond
18 Posner wrote Oxxford at the time he was Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit and more
interested than usual in problems of judicial administration.
19 This standard way of thinking about preliminary injunctions as a way of minimizing Type
I and Type II error is, of course, another contribution of Posner's. See generally American Hospital Supply Corp v Hospital Products Ltd, 780 F2d 589 (7th Cir 1986) (evaluating probability and
severity of harm to the respective parties so as to "minimize the costs of being mistaken").

HeinOnline -- 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1649 2007

1650

The University of Chicago Law Review

[74:1641

within the few days that Oxxford needed relief, but the Seventh Circuit under Posner was an exception." Moreover, the ability to appeal
should not matter. Duress is not a doctrine that serves to protect litigants from judicial error. The right to bring a duress action in the face
of a stupid judicial decision is little more than the right to bring the
same civil action again if the first judge decides incorrectly. Finality is
an essential feature of all civil justice systems, all of which are imperfect in some degree.
If the district court was correct in denying the preliminary injunction, the case of duress is weaker still. Duress should not be available
merely because of the inadequacy of the legal relief available at the
time someone succumbed to the pressure of the situational monopoly.
The standard remedy for breach of contract- expectation damagesis systematically undercompensatory, at least in practice. But a shortfall in the protection contract law provides for victims of breach of
promise cannot be a generic ground for duress. It would essentially
allow a promisee to recover the difference between a fully compensatory damage remedy and the one that the law of contracts has chosen
to provide. Recognizing duress in such cases undercuts the idea under
our law of contract that the promisee's recourse in the event of breach
is expectation damages. A promisor has a choice between performing
or paying damages. As a practical matter, those who bargain for promises are rarely indifferent between the promise and an action for damages, but the law does not give them more.
It is hard to see how duress can exist as a coherent cause of action
when a promisor threatens not to perform and the promisee agrees to
provide additional consideration to induce performance. By demanding higher pay in return for performing, the promisor is merely paying
a price to induce the promisor to give up one of the rights the law
gives her-the right to breach and pay money damages in lieu of performance. At common law, a promisor has the option to pay damages
rather than perform and this option has value.
As long as the parties are physically able to get to court and ask
for preliminary relief, why should they ever be able to plead duress?
Such relief may not be available, but the absence of preliminary relief
suggests that the legal system has made the judgment that suing for
damages after the fact is sufficient. The mechanism the law puts in
place to vindicate a given right cannot be separated from the right
itself. Introducing duress as a backstop second-guesses the decision
20 See generally Kolz v Greer, 1995 WL 231845 (7th Cir) (affirming via expedited review a
preliminary injunction entered on March 21, after hearing the case on March 30, and entering
judgment on April 3). Posner was the Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit from 1993 through 2000.

HeinOnline -- 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1650 2007

2007]

The Young Astronomers

1651

already embedded in the law about the protection afforded someone
who calls on the power of the state to enforce a promise. The idea of
economic duress should not enter the stage, as doing so alters without
justification whatever remedies for breach of contract the law has
chosen to give Oxxford.
Posner has never written an opinion in which he found duress
available to a litigant. But, for the young astronomer-whether
Holmes or Posner-what matters is not what the judge says but the
judgments he issues. For them, the job of the legal pragmatist is one of
mapping the judgments that emerge from litigated disputes. Hence, to
provide an assessment of Posner's approach to duress, we can cast the
net more broadly and look at all the economic duress cases in which
he was on the panel. When we do this, we can find one case in which
he joined an opinion in which a renegotiated agreement was held not
to be enforceable.
In Contempo Design, Inc v Chicago & NE Ill Dist Council of

Carpenters,2 1 the employer and the union agreed to abide by the terms
of an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement unless either
chose to opt out and give the other three months' notice. The agreement included a no-strike clause. Nevertheless, without giving the
proper notice, the workers demanded new terms and went on strike to
secure them. The strike caught Contempo at a time when it was courting a large new customer and facing financial pressure from its banks.
It succumbed to the employee demands to get them back to work and
then sought to have the contract rescinded on the ground that it was
not supported by any additional consideration. The workers, as in
Alaska Packers',were merely promising to do what they were obliged
to do anyway.
The court adopted the same rationale as Alaska Packers'. It decided the case on the ground that the renegotiated contract was not
supported by consideration. The workers were already bound to perform under the collective bargaining agreement. Promising to do what
one is already legally obliged to do is not sufficient consideration to
support a promise. As noted, however, absence of consideration is not
the touchstone for Posner.

226 F3d 535 (7th Cir 2000).
Of course, one cannot say this with complete confidence. There is, as noted above, case
law that focuses on the unenforceability of a contract in which there is no modification of the
original duties, however trivial. Posner, as a judge bound by state court interpretations of the
common law, is bound to follow such precedents, however silly he might think them. Alternatively, he might think that those engaging in a hold-up, even one that the law might tolerate,
should at least cut square corners if they hope to enforce their deal.
21
22
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Why then does Posner find such duress in Contempo Design, but
not Oxxford? The difficulty the employer faced in Contempo was different from the one in Oxxford. Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
federal courts lack the power to issue such an injunction. It might
seem that this should make no difference. If the employer was not
entitled to an injunction, retrieving the money it gave to end the strike
is no different from having a damage remedy for the difference between the value to it of an injunction and its ordinary damage recovery for breach of contract. It would seem that the inability to obtain a
preliminary injunction reflects a judgment that the ordinary damage
remedy was adequate.
But there may be a difference. The inability of a court to enforce
the employer's rights stems from a congressional decision to put a
limit on judicial power in order to bring about labor peace. It is not a
judgment about the ultimate balance of power between labor and
management. The inability to stop the strike derives from a legislative
decision that is unconnected with the remedy to which an employer is
later entitled after the fact. It is different from a decision to limit the
beneficiary of a legally binding promise only with a right to sue for
expectation damages.
Put differently, the postmodern doctrine of duress, as shaped by
Posner, ultimately turns on the availability of the judicial remedy, and
more specifically on the nature of what is constraining its availability.
Distance from the courthouse or an inability to appear before the court
once might have created the situational monopoly that the doctrine
requires, but few parties will ever find themselves out of touch of a
court today. Little else remains. Duress should not be available merely
because the legislature protects a substantive right with a modest remedy. Duress is not an avenue to expand on legal rights. Someone claiming duress must show that the court's inability to grant preliminary relief and the inadequacy of the remedy arise from a circumstance or policy unconnected with the legal right itself. These do not exist very often
as the limits on the power to enjoin are rarely subject to special constraints analogous to those in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Under this view, a case such as Austin Instrument, Inc v Loral

Corp2 may not be rightly decided. The supplier threatened to hold up
the shipment of parts the buyer needed to meet its own contractual
obligations. But the hold-up power arose only because the buyer's
damage remedy was undercompensatory. But this is not a problem
that duress is designed to fix. If specific relief (and a preliminary injunction) were not available, it would seem the buyer's problem was
23

29 NY2d 124,272 NE2d 533 (1971).
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with the modest remedy the law chose to give, not with an inability to
go to court.
A claim of duress should not be available to compensate someone for the benefit she would have received if a preliminary injunction
had been available. If one were entitled to a preliminary injunction,
one should have asked for it. If one asked for it and relief was denied
in error, it should still make no difference. Such errors are part of any
legal system. And if one were not entitled to it in the first place, granting a claim of duress makes even less sense. Unless the court is denied
the power to act for reasons unconnected with the legal right, recognizing a claim of duress merely becomes a backdoor way of obtaining
more relief than the legal system has deemed appropriate. Such is the
way Posner has made sense of the doctrine of economic duress.

IV
Oxxford illustrates the way in which Richard Posner has harnessed the tools of economics to make him a common law judge of
great distinction. By focusing attention first on such questions as
whether the purported victim of duress had access to the court, he
ensures that lower court judges can resolve disputes in ways that both
make sense and are consistent with decided precedent. Ironically, he is
not using the tools of the young astronomer, or at least not in the same
way. Instead of being the objective observer trying to understand the
deep structure of the legal cosmos, he is immersed in the quotidian task
of supervising dozens of lower court judges of sometimes-limited competence. Posner as judge is a pragmatist in an altogether different sense.
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